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In the year 2013, with NATO incorporating policy and strategic changes amid the new 
perceived threat since September 11, 2001, the government of France must again rethink 
and recalibrate its nuclear policy. At least since the end of World War II, France has 
wanted to play a decisive role within European politics, financial affairs, defense, and, 
specifically, it has signified that Paris would offer regional nuclear deterrence for Europe. 
On the one hand, such an enhancement of France’s profile within European defense and 
deterrence would fulfill the Gaullist aspirations for France as a world power and for 
European defense autonomy. On the other hand, practical limits—economic, political, 
and strategic—may break French ambitions. 
Thus, ultimately, this thesis argues that although France may aspire to take center 
stage in European nuclear defense, it is in no practical or political position to do so. And 
even if France could present a credible nuclear deterrent for the region on its own, further 
strategic and political considerations militate against France assuming a different role in 
European defense. Without question, there may be more for France to do in this regard, 
but only in connection with NATO and the United States. 
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I. THE FRENCH: MAKING THEIR GAMMA CAKE AND 
EATING IT, TOO 
In 1960, France became the fourth state to test a nuclear weapon, cementing the 
Fifth Republic’s status as a major power. The Fifth Republic saw such weapons 
technology as the way to regain French superpower status at the height of the Cold War. 
In the 1950s, France embarked on a campaign of building for nuclear energy to power its 
postwar reconstruction and nuclear weapons to deter the USSR. Today, with NATO 
incorporating policy and strategic changes amid the new perceived threat since 
September 11, 2001, France must again rethink and recalibrate its nuclear policy.  
France has wanted to play a larger role within European politics, financial affairs, 
defense, and, specifically, it has signified that Paris would offer regional nuclear 
deterrence for Europe. On the one hand, such an enhancement of France’s profile within 
European defense and deterrence would fulfill the fondest Gaullist aspirations for France 
as a world power and for European defense autonomy. On the other hand, practical 
considerations—economic, political, and strategic—may break French ambitions. Thus, 
the first question is whether France can take over the preeminent position in Europe’s 
nuclear deterrence. The broader issue, though, is whether France should.    
A. FRANCE ALREADY PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE, BUT FAILS TO 
REALIZE IT  
The NATO/U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Europe has been in question for 
decades and the recent U.S. strategic shift to the Pacific has once again put a strain on 
European security at a moment of tension and flux with the world economy. The question 
of European nuclear nations, specifically France, assuming a bigger role in European 
nuclear deterrence becomes important at a time when U.S. priorities and defense 
spending are focused elsewhere. France in the current context must work with NATO to 
maintain its own nuclear credibility, as well as presenting a united face for the 
organization, and to prove to the international community that the European nuclear 
deterrence is still strong. By itself, however, France does not pose a credible regional 
deterrent at present. 
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In today’s nuclear arena, credible deterrence should be maintained for the inward 
and outward perception of strength and resolve. The other part that becomes critical to 
national security is political and diplomatic cohesion. Cohesion in the nuclear age 
becomes intricately important to national defense. With the recent news of French 
reintegration into NATO’s military structure and the Force de Frappe being recognized as 
having a deterrent effect in Europe in the Strategic Concepts document, France must be 
careful when making statements that show diverge from the NATO “standard.” The 
importance of alliance cohesion and deterrence are one and the same. If either the 
credible dissuasion or any inconsistencies within the standing alliances falter, the existing 
French system will only become further marginalized—to the detriment of France, 
Europe, and NATO. 
The politics involved with nuclear deterrence calls attention to many unanswered 
questions involving self-reliance in Europe and keeping the promises between Europe 
and North America. Ever since the inception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
1949, France has been skeptical of the practicality of a NATO led collective defense. 
With European defense through NATO tied to U.S. nuclear weapons, France was not 
convinced that Washington would actually use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe 
(and likely incurring the atomic wrath of the Soviets). Paris also became wary of the 
rearmament of Germany. The ever-present burden-shifting/sharing element within NATO 
exacerbated French unease. Burden-shifting, in the context of France and NATO, came 
down to a trade-off between the U.S. wanting to withdraw its troops from Europe and 
mobilize a larger portion of the European continental defense using European soldiers. 
France would be a large contributor to this European defensive posture due to its relative 
strength compared to other European nations. 
With all of the political pieces in constant motion, the potential for unplanned 
consequences—a rapid deterioration of international relations or, at worst, nuclear war—
is high. The appearance of differences within the Alliance may form an avenue that 
outside aggressors can use to drive a wedge into NATO and divide and conquer the 
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Alliance.1 This dynamic is particularly important in this age of terrorism. Terrorism looks 
not to gain territory; it looks to increase political leverage and credibility for ideological 
reasons.2  NATO in disarray, particularly over such fundamental issues as nuclear 
weapons, may offer exactly such leverage. Thus, France must remain diplomatically 
close to its allies to show terrorist organizations that if France is attacked, many other 
nations will come to its side to combat the threat—and vice-versa. In this context, the 
nuclear factor provides key information on the overall health of the alliance.   
Additionally, any French steps toward a more prominent or more muscular 
nuclear role in Europe may disrupt the delicate process of ridding the world of nuclear 
weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which France is a signatory, sets out to 
eliminate nuclear weapons all together.3 Proliferation and arms control are matters of at 
least as much urgency today as during the Cold War because of the increased threat of 
nuclear terrorism and authoritarian state actors pursuing nuclear weapons for aggressive 
purposes. As such, even the major world powers—especially the major world powers—
have a real, existential interest in lessening nuclear or potentially nuclear tensions in the 
world and in generally de-nuclearizing the strategic and diplomatic discourse. 
Thus, ultimately, this thesis argues that although France may aspire to take center 
stage in European nuclear defense, it is in no practical or political position to do so. And 
even if France could present a credible nuclear deterrent for the region on its own, further 
strategic and political considerations militate against France assuming a different role in 
European defense. Without question, there may be more for France to do in this regard, 
but only in connection with NATO and the United States. 
                                                 
1 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
2003). 
2 Cornell University, Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 2012, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f, accessed August 30, 2012. 
3 United Nations, Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Nuclear Treaty (New York: United 
Nations, 2010).  
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B. ROAD BLOCKS ON FRANCE’S WAY TO REGIONAL DETERRENCE 
Nuclear weapons are no longer seen as strictly a military item; they are political 
objects, as well, and creating or maintaining a credible deterrence becomes critical in the 
security of a nation or region. The term in the arena of nuclear weapons concerns the 
ability of a nuclear state to successfully deter a belligerent from aggressive actions 
towards a nation. Credibility is built upon both the threat and actual use of, in this case, 
nuclear weapons. Yehoshafat Harkabi notes, “For the threat to be credible and convincing 
the threatener must actually be prepared to implement it in the event of aggression.”4  
Harkabi breaks “credible deterrence” down further into three broad categories: 
credibility, capability, and intention. There are several aspects of France’s deterrence 
that, according to the Harkabi categories, can argue against France’s credibility. One 
example is the ability to defend the populous against a nuclear attacks; another is a state’s 
capability to ensure its weapons survive a surprise attack.5 While France has limited 
national capabilities to intercept incoming nuclear weapons with the Aster missile, France 
would need to build more offensive and defensive weapons to support a larger role on the 
continent.6 Such a program would place immense stress on France’s already embattled 
economy, to say nothing of its relations with its European neighbors. 
The principles of credible deterrence and positive control of national nuclear 
weapons were taken into consideration in the French Constitution. Articles 5 and 15 
formed the basis of the control of nuclear weapons where the president was “[t]he 
guarantor of ‘national independence’ and ‘territorial integrity;’”7 as commander-in-chief 
of the French armed forces, he has sole control over nuclear weapons. The policies 
guiding them allow the president to enact an aggressive deterrent strategy to inform 
                                                 
4 Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 
2008), pp 31. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bruno Tertrais, “France,” In Governing the Bomb, by Bates Gill and Heiner Hanggi Hans Born, 103–
132 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 108. 
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foreign nations or independent actors that France will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons 
and inflict an unacceptable level of damage to such belligerents.8  
This strong presidency is a hallmark of Gaullism, of course. The prevalence of 
Gaullism is as relevant today as it was in the 1950s and explains the particular cachet that 
nuclear weapons have in France as a means of gaining international political power. The 
basic tenets of Gaullism are nationalistic in nature. The individuals who subscribe to 
these views look for French independence and grandeur. Gaullists look for France to 
become (or remain) a major world power with a say in the international community and a 
state that does not become subservient to other nations. Certainly throughout the later 20th 
century, nuclear weapons went a long way toward securing France’s status along Gaullist 
lines. At the same time, France does not shy away from, and in fact welcomes, other 
European nations moving underneath the French nuclear umbrella—with French fingers 
alone on the buttons.9 Indeed, throughout French nuclear history, prominent members of 
the government have emphasized the need for an independent France to play a bigger role 
in the nuclear arena for Europe. From President Charles de Gaulle, Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac all the way to President Sarkozy and President Hollande, French leaders 
in the nuclear age have all made provocative statements that show France’s willingness to 
fulfill this role.  
And yet for the entirety of French nuclear history (starting with the first French 
detonation in 1965), no other European nation has joined in any talk of swapping out the 
regional nuclear deterrent for a strictly French presence. This reluctance to change the 
current nuclear agreements with the United States (through NATO) becomes even clearer 
through the European Security Strategy and the Common Security and Defense Policy 
initiative. The ESS and CSDP both describe longing for more unity, but cannot fully 
                                                 
8 IBID., Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Washington, D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 2008). 
9 Anthony Hartley, “Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement,” Outerbridge and 
Dienstfrey, 1971: 329–331. 
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integrate the continent due to sovereignty issues and inexperience.10 European states have 
been reluctant to count on each other for defense, more specifically relying on other 
European nations to provide security for their own nation.11  
The current financial uncertainty throughout Europe has made defense spending 
and decision making progressively difficult for each European nation.12 With finances 
being more closely scrutinized, the problems of modernizing and building a larger and 
immensely expensive weapon becomes a harder sell to the French public. Nonetheless, 
the policies of former French President Nicholas Sarkozy remain largely unaffected by 
the recent change in government, and France has pursued the upgrade and further 
development of the republic’s Force de Frappe to maintain French status as a great 
power. As Charles de Gaulle began the process of greatness in the 1950s, there is little 
doubt that President Hollande will continue development and maintenance of nuclear 
weapons as his predecessors have done.13  
C. WHAT OTHERS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT PARIS 
The story of why France developed its own national nuclear force in the mid-20th 
century is well-known. Titles like The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: France, NATO, 
and the Limits of Independence 1981–97 and Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme 
Commander focus on the position of France in the European system after World War I 
and World War II, and specifically how the advent of the atom bomb became the new 
                                                 
10 Jan Techau, Forget CSDP, It’s Time for Plan B, August 26, 2011,  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/26/forget-csdp-it-s-time-for-plan-b/5zr8, accessed September 06, 
2012; European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security Strategy, Security Strategy, 
Brussels: European Union, 2003;  European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, Security Strategy, Brussels: European Union, 2008. 
11 Ibid., Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Washington, D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 2008). 
12 Simon Rogers and John Burn-Murdoch, Eurozone Debt Crisis, August 02, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/nov/07/euro-debt-crisis-data, accessed August 11, 2012. 
13 Observateur, Le nouvel, TRIBUNE. Holland: “Nuclear Deterrence: I will maintain,” December 20, 





credential for the status of great power.14 Nuclear weapons were seen more as a symbol 
and bargaining chip on the international stage. As such, de Gaulle undertook to create a 
national nuclear force that would give France security and a say in global affairs.15 These 
developments created certain frictions within the trans-Atlantic alliance—some of which 
were entirely welcome to the independence-minded de Gaulle and his ideological 
fellows.  
The intransigent French insistence on both fashioning an autonomous nuclear 
force and retaining absolute national control over these weapons ultimately led to 
France’s partial rupture with NATO during the tenure of General Lauris Norstad 
(SACEUR). Robert Jordan notes that France’s aims to control nuclear weapons were 
“motivated both by prestige and by a desire to become less dependent upon the U.S.”16 
De Gaulle’s wartime experience with the Anglo-Americans left him even less inclined to 
cede even a hint of control of his nuclear assets to distant and distracted allies.   
Immersed in the weight of this history, French leaders have made the 
government’s policies on nuclear weapons both provocative and restrictive. Scholars like 
Bruno Tertrais, David Yost, and others have detailed French nuclear policies to be 
carefully installed to clearly display France’s willingness to use nuclear weapons as a 
first strike weapon, but also show the French people that such weapons would only be 
used to protect France’s vital interests.17  
Most texts discuss other European nation’s feelings about the continent being 
protected further by France and perhaps less by the United States (through NATO). But 
                                                 
14 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
INC., 2000); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martin’s Press LLC, 
2003); Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981–97 (London: Antony Rowe 
Ltd, Chppenham, Wiltshire, 2000).  
15 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martin’s Press LLC, 2003). 
16 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
INC., 2000), 105. 
17 David Yost, Adelphi Papers, number 194, French Deterrence (London: The Garden City Press Ltd, 
Letchworth, 1984); David Yost, “France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy,” Survival, 2005: 117–146; David 
Yost, “France’s new nuclear doctrine,” International Affairs, 2006: 701–721; Bruno Tertrais, A 
Comparison Between U.S., UK And French Nuclear Policies And Doctrines, Paris: Chercheur associe au 
CERI, 2007; Bruno Tertrais, “France,” In Governing the Bomb, by Bates Gill and Heiner Hanggi Hans 
Born, 103–132 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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with the situation being as delicate as it is, France’s first-use policy has many other 
European nations on edge about an increased French position on the nuclear stage.18 The 
first-use, or final warning, policy is the strategy that France has adopted to respond to 
aggression. With a limited supply of nuclear weapons and the threat of a large scale 
attack, France needed a forceful policy to where Paris would strike with nuclear weapons 
first, which would deliver an unacceptable level of damage to a belligerent and deter 
them from carrying out further aggression. The ambitious policy was harmful to the rest 
of Europe because by France launching a preemptive nuclear strike, Europe would now 
be a nuclear battlefield with no other continental nation had the ability to use its own 
deterrent (because they had none).19  
There are problems that can arise from a nuclear shift in Europe. First, the 
domestic feelings towards nuclear weapons are negative.20 Gabrielle Hecht covers public 
polls from 1946 until the mid-1960s which ask the French public whether the government 
should have an atomic weapon, with an initial response of 56 percent wanting a weapon 
and moving downward to just 23 percent in 1967.21 Lawrence S. Wittner compliments 
the argument by discussing the numerous protests and revolts against nuclear power and 
nuclear weapons.22 Even today the BBC has noted nuclear protests in France and Britain 
in 2011 after the nuclear disaster in Japan.23 With a clear message sent to the French 
government about the utility of disarmament, why does the government seek to build its 
forces to take on a larger role in Europe?  
                                                 
18 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
INC., 2000); Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981–97 (London: Antony 
Rowe Ltd, Chppenham, Wiltshire, 2000). 
19 Bruno Tertrais, A Comparison Between U.S., UK And French Nuclear Policies And Doctrines, 
Paris: Chercheur associe au CERI, 2007; Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France’s 
Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, 2007: 251–273; David Yost, “France’s Evolving 
Nuclear Strategy,” Survival, 2005: 117–146. 
20 Angus Reid Global Monitor, Angus Reid Public Opinion, September 18, 2007, accessed August 01, 
2012, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/27829/global_poll_finds_varied_views_on_nuclear_weapons/. 
21 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998), 
243.  
22 Lawrence S. Wittner, “The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975–
78*,” Journal of Peace Research Vol 40, 2003: 435–456. 
23 BBC, Anti-nuclear protests in Germany and France, April 2011, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13188507. 
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The topic of disarmament does show convergence between the two entities and 
while universal disarmament is the goal, neither the French government nor the French 
people want to be the first nuclear nation to completely dissolve their nuclear program. In 
the 2007 Angus Reid poll noted earlier, the French people show a clear division between 
using nuclear weapons in war and using nuclear weapons as a deterrent against attack. 
The poll shows that twice as many people in France welcome nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent force and only 15 percent of the French people want to use such weapons in a 
war.24 While French citizens have been skeptical of their government, they are 
committed to universal disarmament, as long as France is not the first to commit to it 
whole heartedly. With the history between the French Government and the citizens 
strained in pockets from 1789 until the present, France must continue to strive for 
universal disarmament and not provoke more civil unrest within her borders that may 
cause instability in the region.25  
With the potential internal struggle, France’s external tussles also pose a threat 
that also point to the maintenance of its position in nuclear affairs. With a larger concern 
for terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons and an increased threat of newly formed nations 
with infant governments as annotated in the European Security Strategy (2003), the threat 
of an asymmetric nuclear exchange is particularly heightened. Any sudden change in the 
French policy may result in an escalation of tensions and result in unintended 
consequences. Many international situations can be solved by democratic means, but 
nuclear weapons are based on realistic principles. John J. Mearsheimer describes nuclear 
weapons and specifically the arms race in terms of offensive and defensive realism. 
Mearsheimer believes that once a country goes nuclear, there thirst for power does not 
stop.26 There may be no way to avoid situation where the smallest shift in posture, policy 
or technology may cause another Cold War. The potential re-emergence of another Cold 
                                                 
24 Angus Reid Global Monitor, Angus Reid Public Opinion, September 18, 2007, http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/27829/global_poll_finds_varied_views_on_nuclear_weapons/. 
25 IBID., Monitor, Angus Reid Global Monitor, Angus Reid Public Opinion, September 18, 2007, 
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/27829/global_poll_finds_varied_views_on_nuclear_weapons/.  
26 John Mearsheimer, Tradegy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
2001). 
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War is all the more reason to maintain the status quo while working with the international 
community to universally disarm all nuclear weapons. Consider recent events 
surrounding the United States, France and Russia involving the modernizations of their 
nuclear weapons.  
Washington has proposed a significant upgrade and modernization program 
including modernization to every point of the nuclear triad, requesting more than $110 
billion in funding for fiscal year 2013.27 The French, beginning in 2008, have begun to 
replace the existing ballistic missile submarines with the new Le Triomphant Class 
submarine. We have also seen the implementation of the M51.1 ballistic missile to be 
carried by the new submarines.28 Moscow has also been improving its nuclear forces 
since the late 1990s and continues through the present.29 Although the original Cold War 
context of security was based on the numbers of nuclear weapons, which caused the arms 
race, the nuclear powers may already be engaged in an arms race based upon the level of 
efficiency and redundancy within each nation’s nuclear force. With the innovations 
happening not for the fear of a terrorist agency possessing one weapon, but because of 
other nuclear nations cultivating their nuclear abilities, their actions may exacerbate the 
nuclear instability throughout the globe.30 With the European Union focused on nuclear 
terrorism and France seemingly more concerned over nuclear armed nation states, France 
cannot convince the continent to support the French aspirations and Paris should focus on 
strengthening NATO, the EU, and the UN while maintaining a national autonomous 
deterrence.  
                                                 
27 Kelsey Davenport, Fact Sheet: U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs, March 22, 2012, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization. 
28 Wade Boese, France Upgrades, Trims Nuclear Arsenal, 2008, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/France. 
29 Pavel Podvig, Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization, Nuclear Forces, 
(Security Studies Center, 2011). 
30 NATO, Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, May 20, 2012, 
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D. FRANCE AND THE HAPPY MEDIUM 
With the continual importance placed on nuclear weapons, how will France’s 
nuclear policies and practices uphold the status quo or perhaps modify its nuclear sector 
in a way that will not provoke increased aggression? To answer this question, this thesis 
will undertake a case study of the history of French nuclear weapons development and 
the policies associated with it, the current nuclear dynamic inside Europe and what will a 
potential shift in the French nuclear department cause in the international arena. Using 
historical and contemporary literature pertaining to nuclear weapons, the thesis will 
further develop the role of history and aspirations of grandeur play in the current and 
future endeavors of France. The emphasis of the historical section is intended to display 
consistencies between scholars who are intimately familiar with the topic and to further 
advance the underlying reasons to the development of an independent nuclear force. The 
section on current events will develop an area previously undeveloped, the necessary 
infrastructure for France to make good on its promise.  
With the current nuclear dynamic, the intent is to show a clear shift in policy 
through Cold War and the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. This shift in threats 
within the last two decades from an established national threat, such as Russia, to a threat 
posed by a failing state or terrorist organization possessing nuclear weapons. The change 
in threats displayed by the European Security Strategy (2003) correlates to the French 
insinuating a policy where, “missiles would not be oriented in only one direction… at 
every point of the compass.”31 The aggressive posture is valuable to France and may also 
be for Europe, but this thesis will show the continued importance to maintain the status 
quo and to have Paris continue to work closely with NATO to further develop and 
promote the NPT for the purpose of non-escalations throughout the globe. Among other 
sources, this aspect of the research will rely on opinion polls that will again show the 
                                                 
31 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martin’s Press LLC, 2003), 
307. 
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connection between the French citizen and politics, which will underscore the need for 
Paris to maintain its current position in nuclear affairs.32  
With the sensitivity of nuclear weapons, this thesis will show that France’s 
numerous protestations about an expanded role fulfill France’s aspirations for a larger 
role. From Charles de Gaulle in the late 1950s to President Hollande in 2011, numerous 
top French officials continue to want to provide deterrence for Europe.33 French officials 
either make a direct connection to Europe and commit to NPT or cloak their aspirations 
for an expanded nuclear force by stating that France will protect its vital interests.  
This thesis will show that merely showing its willingness can add a deterrent 
effect and that France should not actively pursue the goal of a larger role. NATO has 
acknowledged that France, not allowing its nuclear weapons to be placed under NATO’s 
controls, has a deterrent effect within Europe without having to alter any facet within 
Paris. This inclusion by NATO should be the happy medium that France needs to 
maintain its prestige and not hurt its own political or financial status.34     
E. THE WAY AHEAD 
The French nuclear weapons issue and the way in which France should move 
forward form an important topic that deserves to be developed. To do this, the thesis will 
first discuss the importance of French history dating back to the French Revolution and 
through the current events of today’s global issues. With the chapter revealing the 
importance of NATO maintaining nuclear deterrence, the history of NATO and its 
reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons to safeguard Europe and how NATO intends to 
continue to deter outside aggressors from attacking the EU. Once the history of the two 
                                                 
32 IBID., European Security Strategy (2003); Angus Reid Global Monitor, Angus Reid Public Opinion, 
September 18, 2007, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/27829/ 
global_poll_finds_varied_views_on_nuclear_weapons/. 
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institutions is established, the discussion will look at the current domestic and 
international factors that influence France and NATO’s nuclear policy. The history and 
current factors of France and NATO’s U.S. nuclear weapons will help in the 
establishment of the way ahead for each entity and why each has chosen a certain path for 
the future.  
The next section of the thesis brings the argument further in which France cannot 
and should not take a larger role in nuclear deterrence of Europe because of other EU 
nations being skeptical and the domestic circumstances within France cannot support 
such a bold venture. The final chapter will draw conclusions to the importance to have 
France maintain the status quo within the international community. The possible 
consequences of continued empty statements may only rock the figurative boat and by 
not maintaining, France may cause other nuclear nations to become more irritated and 
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II. NUCLEAR GRANDEUR: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT OF 
FRANCE’S NUCLEAR POSTURE 
French nuclear strategy is as much a product of French history as it is of French 
science, industry and technology. Indeed, most of the hallmarks of the French approach 
to nuclear weapons—including most prominently the sense of decline and disadvantage 
that impels the French to ply an independent nuclear track in the name of national honor 
and prestige—owe to French history and its experience of force and statecraft. 
Specifically, the factors that have informed French nuclear strategy since the end of 
World War II were present at the creation of the first French republic in 1789 and show 
themselves in strategic culture which forms the subject of this chapter. Because the past 
is so present in French strategic thinking and strategic culture, this chapter explores the 
developments that inform the French security policy and its stance on nuclear weapons 
today as well as the current-day manifestations of these historical trends in French 
nuclear strategy and policy. 
A. REVOLUTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
While the true aggrandizement began in the 19th century, the time before the 
French Revolution, France was viewed as one of, if not, the most prominent powers in 
the west, at the forefront of European culture and a formidable player in the region’s 
foreign relations as well. The French Empire controlled vast lands and wealth.35 As so 
many of the other established European powers, France had a feudal system in place, 
which bound people to certain “estates.” The first estate housed the Church, the second 
estate contained Nobility and the third comprised everyone else—including the newly 
self-aware middle class, skilled artisans, and would-be industrializers.36 (By the dawn of 
the Absolutist age, the king sat separately from all three estates to order affairs among 
them according to God’s will.)  When the old social order—and the laws that sustained 
the status quo—could neither fulfill the third estate’s growing desire for a voice in its 
                                                 
35 French Colonial Empires, n.d., accessed October 10, 2012,  http://www.thelatinlibrary.com 
/imperialism/notes/frenchempire.html. 
36 Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1955). 
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own governance nor completely quell the agitations that arose amid this frustration, 
France was consumed by revolution. 
Alexis De Tocqueville describes the ultimate goal of the French Revolution as: 
The French Revolution’s approach to the problems of man’s existence 
here on earth was exactly similar to that of the religious revolutions as 
regards his afterlife. It viewed the ‘citizen’ from an abstract angle, that is 
to say as an entity independent of any particular social order, just as 
religions view the individual, without regard to nationality or the age he 
lives in. It did not aim merely at defining the rights of the French citizen, 
but sought also to determine the rights and duties of men in general 
towards each other and as members of a body politic.37  
The French Revolution thus was an attempt to close the gap between the 
government and the people. Initially, the struggle to break out of the ancien regime’s 
estates structure culminated with a constitution. Then this bourgeois revolution gave way 
to a much more radical agenda—and leaders willing to resort to state-sponsored violence, 
denunciation, and ideological “spot checks” to effect this social engineering. With French 
society roiling amid escalating instability and France’s neighbors/enemies massing at its 
borders to seize by arms any advantage that might have come from the unsettled 
situation, Napoleon staged a coup d’etat, he believed, to return France to some semblance 
of preeminence. The French public, in its turn, not only accepted but embraced a strong 
executive—culminating when Napoleon crowned himself emperor in 1804—in the name 
of restoring order at home and finding glory over the borders.38 
Although Napoleon could claim domestic and foreign successes only for a short 
while—and, arguably, his overreach in 1812 began the process of decline from which 
France has yet to recover intellectually or politically, the French public ever since has 
sought a leader who is strong and passionate about Paris. Figures from Napoleon III, 
Petain and de Gaulle all show similar traits in that they are highly centralized in their 
belief of government control, but were all elected by the people.  
                                                 
37 Ibid., 12. 
38 Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers (Great Britain: HarperCollins, 2005). 
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B. NAPOLEON GOES NUCLEAR 
France’s nuclear weapon’s policy began in the mid-20th century, but the real 
motivating ideals and guidelines had been imprinted into French culture much earlier. 
The traits manifested especially in revolutionary and post-revolutionary France carried 
over into policies and in the context of nuclear weapons as embodiment’s French national 
power. The desire to gain and maintain prestige was important to French leaders and 
pairing the French ideal with military technology was de Gaulle’s way of regaining the 
prestige that France has lost or has thought it lost, most recently with the ignominy of 
defeat, occupation, and collaboration with the Nazis in World War II. 
Charles de Gaulle agreed with the technocrats, who believed technology and 
grandeur are linked, and began investing in technological development. De Gaulle 
believed technology could not only revive French preeminence, but improve relations 
with its former colonies and increase French standing in international affairs. A collection 
of scientists and technical experts, The Groupe 1985, had this to say about the change of 
France:  
The first unexpected challenge is the intellectual and cultural survival of 
an original and individual France. Indeed this scientific civilization will 
increasingly tend to attenuate national specificities and deformities. From 
now on our presence in the world depends on our ability to imprint our 
mark on this civilization by means of significant contributions from 
French technology and French science.39 
The quote, even though it comes somewhat later into the technological development, 
echoes historical references to the critical linkage between French preeminence and 
technology, in this case nuclear. (It also demonstrates the persistence of this linkage.)  
France looked to its technical experts who proposed that technologic reform could bring 
France back to a position of primacy. France certainly had the technical knowledge and 
could certainly pursue technical achievements because of its numerous Nobel Prize 
winners in the fields of physics and chemistry. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 39. 
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Thus, the nuclear era of France began in earnest with the Fifth Republic of 
Charles de Gaulle and his politique de grandeur in 1958. France, with the advent of de 
Gaulle and Gaullism, continued a trend of strong executives as the antidote for real and 
perceived decline that had been endemic in the III and IV republics in the period from the 
1930s until the end of the 1950s. Robert Neumann noted that the General, as he called de 
Gaulle, “was not averse to democratic control.… But he demanded that he should be left 
alone to govern while he was in office.”40 Neumann emphasizes that Gaullism (and de 
Gaulle himself) believes this style of government equate with “the welfare of the country 
and the state.”41  
This very muscular presidency is written into the very constitution of the Fifth 
Republic. Articles 5 through 19 delineate the authority of the president of the republic. 
Article 5 states: “The President of the Republic shall ensure due respect for the 
Constitution. He shall ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public 
authorities and the continuity of the State. He shall be the guarantor of national 
independence, territorial integrity….”42 Article 15 takes the authority of the president to 
protect France into leading military forces by saying, “The President of the Republic shall 
be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.”43 The last article in the constitution also 
displays traditional concerns for control. Article 16 discusses emergency powers for the 
president. Article 16 grants emergency powers to the president, after consulting the Prime 
Minister, Houses of Parliament and the Constitutional Council, for the purpose of 
protecting France. These powers given to the president are authorized for a period of 30 
days and the decisions may be referred to the Constitutional Council by the rest of 
government to decide whether or not the actions taken by the president shall continue.44   
                                                 
40 Robert G. Neumann, “Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France,” The Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1953: 250–274, 251. 
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The French White Papers echo the language presented in the Constitution by 
relating presidential powers to nuclear weapons and deterrence. Section 11 of the White 
Papers, states that, “Our nuclear deterrent will continue to be fully independent, with the 
relevant capabilities at the disposal of the President.”45 As Neumann writes, “For this 
contingency, [the president] wants to preserve his movement, and especially his prestige 
as a peerless leader in desperate times.”46 In this sense, then, basic French nuclear policy 
represents a clear continuity in French history: the strong executive. 
In its independence, it also reflects the French quest to keep their country among 
the ranking powers of the world. In this connection, the Final Warning Concept embodies 
every aspect of French nuclear policy. The concept revolves around a heavy threat from 
the French, which coupled with the vague language and policy gave France the edge in 
Europe. France’s strong language on the topic an aggressive move against the French was 
a warning that if France’s vital interests were threatened, it would launch a limited 
nuclear strike to halt the aggression and if such aggression did not cease, Paris would 
launch an all-out nuclear strike. Any potential belligerent would, in theory, suffer such 
destruction that it would then turn back and not retaliate. Tellingly, these doomsday 
scenarios imagine France acting alone in its own nuclear defense. 
C. FRENCH NUCLEAR HISTORY 
Before France could construct nuclear weapons, Paris had to develop its own 
nuclear energy program. Although the initial French thrust into the nuclear arena was 
stable nuclear power, it quickly transitioned into nuclear weapons. In December 1948, the 
first nuclear reactor nicknamed ZOE (Zero power, uranium Oxide fuel, and Eau lourde) 
went critical. Throughout the 1950s, an additional three reactors were built (EL-2, G-1 
and G-2) and provided the initial material to process for nuclear weapons. Today, France 
has built more than 20 nuclear power plants throughout the country and touts its civilian 
                                                 
45 Presidence De La Republique, The French White Paper on Defense and National Security, National 
Security, Paris: French Republic, 2008, 30. 
46 Robert G. Neumann, “Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France,” The Western Political 
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nuclear program even while such neighbors as Germany have sought to de-nuclearize the 
national power grid.  
Although the initial French thrust into the nuclear arena was stable nuclear power, 
it quickly transitioned into nuclear weapons. In fact, the French started their atom-bomb-
making efforts almost as soon as World War II ended. A nuclear weapons program 
requires the extraction and enrichment of certain nuclear elements to be able to produce 
weapons-grade nuclear material. Le Bouchet, built in 1949, was the first facility in France 
to begin extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods from ZOE. The process became 
more fruitful with the completion of France’s second reactor located to the Southwest of 
Paris, at Saclay. A second facility designed to extract materials became operational in 
Marcoule (located at the site of the G-1 facility) in 1959. With the initial building blocks 
now in place, American intelligence believed France was ready to start developing a 
nuclear device. In a weekly intelligence summary by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the opening sentence captures the reality of French ambitions by saying, “France 
now may have the capability of exploding a nuclear device of nominal yield at any time, 
and intensive preparations for a test have been reported recently.”47  
It was not until December 1954 that Pierre Mendes-France, the Prime Minister at 
the time, authorized the production of France’s first atomic bomb. The initial go-ahead 
could have been issued earlier in the year, but domestic concerns over nuclear weapons 
stifled development for a few months. Paris detonated its first nuclear bomb on February 
13, 1960, with the predecessor of what would be the first operational warhead. The AN-
11 and later the AN-22 warheads were a plutonium-based fission weapon designed for 
gravity bombs. These early weapons had a yield of up to 120 kilotons. Rather than rely 
on its allies, France fielded these two warheads, in addition to the MR-31 missile-
launched warhead, as strategic weapons for the sole purpose of protecting France.  
                                                 
47 Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary 18 September 1958, 
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1958). 
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1. Land-based Nuclear Missiles 
The first initiative, taken on by the Society for Research and Development of 
Ballistic Engines (SEREB), was to create a land/sea-based missile with an approximate 
range of just over 1600 nautical miles. The result was the SSBS series missile. The 
missile, which was 50 feet tall and four feet wide, was capable of propelling a warhead 
approximately 300 miles and successfully launched in 1965.48 As SEREB continued 
developing land/sea-based missiles, the SSBS matured to the SSBS S01, SSBS S02 and 
ended with the SSBS S3. The SSBS S3, created in the 1980s, had a range of 2140 miles 
and able to carry a 1200 kiloton nuclear warhead. The most recent missile, stationed in 
the South of France, would be capable of hitting targets as far away as Moscow. The 
land-based nuclear missiles stood their last day of watch in 1996, when France, in 
accordance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (1968), decided to end the program 
and rely solely on submarine-launched and air-launched systems. With the shared 
delivery system technology, the issue for France was to create a delivery platform that 
would best suit the missiles capabilities.49  
2. The French Nuclear Navy  
The nuclear submarine was first successfully demonstrated by the Americans in 
1955, with the launching of the USS Nautilus.50 The nuclear submarine was the ideal 
choice for the up-and-coming nuclear triad due to its endurance. These vessels were only 
limited by the men’s need of food, supplies and family. The vessels could submerge for 
long periods of time and await the command to deliver a nuclear payload anywhere in the 
world.51  
                                                 
48 Encyclopedia Astronautica, SSBS, n.d., accessed November 20, 2012, 
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France, noting the initial U.S. success, set out on a separate and independent 
nuclear submarine development project. March of 1963, marked the authorization to 
build the Le Redoutable, a 128 foot, 8,000 ton ballistic missile submarine. She was 
designed to submerge to great depths, maintain a speed of over 20 knots while 
underwater and more importantly to this discussion, carry 16 M20 submarine launched 
ballistic missiles with a range of 3100 milometers (1673 nautical miles). Le Redoutable 
was completed in 1971 and by 1977, the French had a force of four submarines capable 
of fulfilling the Force de Dissuasion (now known as the Force de Frappe).  
With missile development continuing to produce more capable delivery systems 
for submarines, France built the L’inflexible. While the general design of the previous 
class of submarine remained unchanged, advances in the propulsion and weapons 
systems were improved to handle the Exocet anti-ship missile and the M4 SLBM.52 The 
M4 came into existence in 1985 as the fourth generation of Mer-Sol-Balistique-
Strategique (MSBS) family of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The M-4 (A/B 
Models), and eventually the M-45 and M-51 missiles, were developed as an intermediate-
range missile capable of carrying a sizable nuclear warhead anywhere from 4,000 to 
6,000 kilometers (2160–3240 nautical miles). The current system onboard the current Le 
Triomphant class SSBN (of which four are operational) will be equipped with the M-51 
delivery vehicle for the foreseeable future.53  
3. Nuclear Aviation  
France, beginning in 1954, simultaneously began development of nuclear 
submarines and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bomb/missiles. The leading company 
for the development was Dassault. The company sought to take the Mirage III design and 
re-design it to carry the AN22 nuclear bomb. The Mirage IV had a two-person crew, 
inflight refueling capable, dual engine and had a range of 1600 kilometers (863 nautical 
                                                 
52 L’Inflexible Class, 2013, accessed December 20, 2012, http://www.military-
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53 Nuclear Weapons, July 24, 2011,accessed December 21, 2012,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/france/nuke.htm. 
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miles) with one nuclear bomb attached to it. By 1964, the Mirage IV was delivered to the 
French air force and the more than 50 planes continued to serve until 1996.  
The next generation Mirage 2000N would replace the Mirage IV in 1983. The 
Mirage 2000N had no other function than to deliver nuclear payloads to an enemy. 
Again, with most of the rest of the French nuclear capable aircraft, the range leaves much 
to be desired. The 2000N has a range of 800 nautical miles, which would allow the 
bomber to fly as far as the Ukraine and Belarus.54  
Just recently, Paris has purchased the Rafale F3 Bomber to replace the Mirage 
2000N in 2009. The Rafale boasts numerous upgrades and is a multi-role aircraft that can 
carry numerous weapons including the ASMP nuclear missile. For France’s aspirations of 
regional deterrence, the Rafale helps to widen the range of its nuclear deterrence to just 
short of 1000 nautical miles.55 The nuclear dyad Paris boasts has credibility with regards 
to France, but coupled with French nuclear strategy leaves people wanting more. Before 
one can get to strategy, a budget and currency must be established to form a strategy that 
can be sustained by monetary funds. 
D. FRENCH DETERRENCE 
Once de Gaulle began to develop offensive nuclear weapons technology, he 
needed to generate credible policies, keeping with the French traditions and beliefs, to 
protect France. For de Gaulle, 
[t]he main role he saw for France’s nuclear force was determined by his 
view that nuclear weapons were the major source of contemporary 
international power and influence… Later he saw nuclear weapons as a 
way of providing France with a distinctive identity and a power base from 
which to criticize the hegemonic aspirations of the United States.56   
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Some of the first meetings to discuss credible deterrence were held in the summer 
of 1956. Top officials in France (military and civilian) sat down with General Pierre 
Gallois, a leading military official and noted international strategist supporting an 
autonomous nuclear arm, to lay the foundation of what presently became the Force de 
Frappe. General Gallois urged the move toward nuclear weapons. Gallois also advised 
French leadership to develop a one way nuclear force. During the meeting General 
Gallois stated, “He [Gallois] evidently advocated a one-way nuclear striking force as the 
most feasible kind of French deterrent.”57  
The French deterrent (or dissuasion as Frenchmen call it) has always been on the 
aggressive side. Bruno Tertrais, a noted scholar on French nuclear weapons, repeatedly 
uses the word “preeminence” to describe French nuclear policy.58 Tertrais demonstrates 
the need for France to be in a dominant position and the concurrent belief that France is 
not a second-tier nuclear power. The deterrence focuses on a highly centralized 
government with a select few in charge of decision-making.  
It also aspires to a very prominent role in European defense for France and its 
nuclear weapons. Dr. David Yost notes that Jacques Chirac, then Prime minister, said in 
1975, “we cannot be content to “sanctuarize” our own territory, and we must look beyond 
our frontiers’….”59  The 1990s also showed a different tactic by Paris to engage Europe 
on regional deterrence by talking to Germany. France tried to include Germany under its 
nuclear umbrella and sign a bilateral agreement in 1995 to which Klaus Kinkel, the 
German Foreign minister, said that Germany had, “no intention of taking part in a nuclear 
force, ‘even by the back door’.”60  The attempt to create a bilateral agreement with 
Germany made Russian president Boris Yeltsin to describe the French attempt as a, 
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“mistake” and the “decision is unexpected and wrong.”61  The grumblings of the former 
Soviet Union did not stop France from continued claims to reach its perceived goal.  
The new millennium began with President Chirac issuing a speech in June of 
2001, in which he touched upon nuclear issues. He stated, 
Finally, it is France’s wish that our nuclear deterrent also contribute to 
Europe’s security. It thus participates in the overall deterrent that can be 
exerted by the democracies joined together by the treaty of collective 
security concluded, over 50 years ago, by Europe, the United States and 
Canada. In any case, it is up to the president of the [French] Republic to 
assess the harm that might be done to our vital interests in a given 
situation. This assessment would naturally take into account the growing 
solidarity of the countries of the European Union.62   
President Chirac continued his public speeches in 2006, when he addressed the 
French Air Force. He goes through the progression that even though in 2006 there was, 
according to Chirac, no direct threat from a major power, the future may still present a 
threat from states. The French president moves on to discuss the current globe is still 
seeking new balances of power and members of the global community are trying to 
unbalance the global situation. It is on page 4 of his speech that President Chirac 
introduces the expanded role of France in nuclear deterrence. Chirac states, 
The integrity of our territory, the protection of our population, the free 
exercise of our sovereignty will always be the heart of our vital interests. 
But they are not beyond. The perception of these interests is changing 
pace with the world marked by the growing interdependence of European 
countries and also by the effects of globalization. For example, 
safeguarding our strategic supplies or defense of allied nations, are, 
amoung others, interests that must be protected.63  
The successor to President Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, continued the legacy 
of other French officials when he was present for the launch of the nuclear submarine Le 
Terrible in 2008. He moves through his speech and discusses the continued need for 
nuclear weapons to provide both national and international deterrence. President Sarkozy 
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states, “As for Europe, it is a fact: By their very existence, French nuclear forces are a 
key element in Europe’s security.”64  An even more convincing statement to the question 
of what France perceives its role to be comes directly after the previous quote and he 
states, “I propose to engage those European partners who would so wish in an open 
dialogue on the role of deterrence and its contribution to our common security.”65  While 
Sarkozy and his successor now president Francois Hollande have very different views on 
certain topics, one area where they agree is their aspirations to promote regional nuclear 
deterrence.  
In one of the first articles posted during his attempt to become president, 
candidate Hollande (at that time) maintained that he would maintain French nuclear 
deterrence. Hollande said, “Our efforts for world peace, for disarmament and for 
European integration, is consistent with our desire to preserve the vital interests of our 
nation.”66  Again, the current president of France maintains decades of French 
perceptions of providing nuclear deterrence for the rest of Europe.  
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III. FRANCE IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER: 
NUCLEARIZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Nuclear weapons have been the way in which France could rebalance power 
throughout the globe. While France looks at nuclear weapons as a way to become a 
bigger player in world affairs, the rest of the world may have other opinions of French 
traditions. While nuclear weapons may ease certain domestic political tensions for 
France, they raise their own specific set of international concerns, which also reflect the 
historical developments and ideas that have shaped each state as well as the international 
system of states since 1945. 
The two major players within Europe that concern themselves with France are the 
United States of America and the European Union. The United States, for the purposes of 
nuclear affairs in Europe, works through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
European Union, which embodies the collective voice of European states. Since the end 
of World War II, France did not trust the United States and its security guarantees. The 
other European states, being ravaged from two total wars, were heavily reliant on the 
U.S. guarantee and were not ready to rely upon a fledgling European Community. The 
history of France may be irrelevant to other nations, but they form the basis for the rest of 
the European player’s irritation with France. 
This dependence on America created the trans-Atlantic link and provides a point 
of contest within Europe and the United States of America. The end of World War II 
shows the continued reliance on the Americans by the Europeans because of the severe 
state that the Europeans were economically and militarily, which eventually led to the 
creation of NATO and the U.S. led security of Europe. While most European states 
welcomed the U.S. security guarantees, Charles de Gaulle and the French became 
uncertain of the United States commitments.67  
                                                 
67 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
INC., 2000). 
 28
A. A COLD HANDSHAKE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
For the United States, the belief was that France was being difficult and somewhat 
un-grateful of the opportunities that America was providing to it and the rest of Western 
Europe. The United States began to build a defensive posture against the Soviet Union, 
including a significant European presence and eventually an extended nuclear deterrent. 
The dust had barely settled over occupied Germany when the United States came to 
believe that a strong—but allied—Germany would be central to holding back the Soviets. 
The French, who share borders with Germany, had seen what a militarized Germany can 
do to a continent and rallied against the American idea. With the growing tensions 
between the Soviets and the Europeans, France ultimately gave up its grievances about a 
re-armed Germany and fell in line with the western allies. While the United States, 
Europe, and France all looked east for the greatest threat, each had different reasons for 
its decisions and France chose to aspire to a top position in world affairs through nuclear 
means.68  
The United States also thwarted the French and United Kingdom during the Suez 
Canal crisis of 1956. The Suez, built in 1869 by the French engineer de Lesseps, had 
massive ties to France and Britain (who owned the largest portion of control). A 1936 
treaty allowed British troops on the canal to maintain defensive posturing on the canal. 
By 1954, the Egyptian signed a treaty that removed British troops from the Canal Zone. 
Egypt began to become more assertive in the region and nationalized the Suez on 26 July 
1956. Paris and London were caught off guard and angered the two capitals because they 
both owned stock in the canal company. France, UK and Israel joined forces and began to 
conceptualize military operations to take back the Canal. Washington spoke out against 
such actions and forced an immediate stand down in hostilities. The aggression shown by 
France, as well as the UK and Israel, drew Egypt closer to the USSR and created 
instability during the Cold War between the East and West. The episode in Egypt was 
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another example where The United States stepped in to stop a possible resurgence of 
colonialism. With both France and Britain former empires, the United States could not 
afford to be dragged into a conflict involving possible colonial aspirations.69 
Another issue erupted in 1958 over Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBM). The United States of America, working through NATO, wanted to forward 
deploy IRBM’s on the European continent in France and Britain. The Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Norstad, had been engaged in placing IRBM’s 
in France and Britain that would be under NATO’s control. Charles de Gaulle was 
somewhat unhappy with the proposed arrangement and wanted a French military official 
to be incorporated into the IRBM chain of command. The French did not presume to gain 
total control, as the French military official would be subordinate to SACEUR. As time 
went on, the issue of control spilled over into the nuclear stockpile arena. France was 
under the impression that this agreement to stockpile NATO (U.S.) nuclear weapons was 
going to be handled in a more bilateral way as opposed to the SACEUR and U.S. belief 
being that all of the nuclear weapons would be under a multilateral NATO control. Now 
the dispute turned towards nuclear strategy. Again France sought to make a separate table 
for the “three” superpowers to develop a global strategy for NATO without the other 
nations consent. The United States never considered, and would be nervous about, having 
Washington, Paris and London conducting global atomic strategy without the other 
members. For de Gaulle, he was unhappy that NATO members who do not possess 
“global responsibilities”70 (superpowers) taking part in nuclear planning decisions or 
blocking nuclear actions. With the handshake growing colder between the French and 
Americans, France was trying to build a counterweight to the U.S./UK and tried to 
entangle Germany, but Germany would honor its commitments. The German Chancellor, 
Konrad Adenauer, noted “de Gaulle’s motives as reflecting an underlying animosity 
toward the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Powers, coupled with a desire to line up the FRG [Federal 
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Republic of Germany] and Italy as counterweights to his perception of the Anglo-
American dominance in NATO.”71 
By 1959, President Charles de Gaulle pulled out of the agreement to have the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile placed inside France. The French president also removed half of its 
Mediterranean from NATO’s control. The action of removing vessels immediately 
outraged SACEUR because these vessels were flying the French flag, but owned by the 
United States. French and U.S. relations were now at an all-time low. General Norstad, 
being worried about a tactical air defense plan, removed numerous aquadrons from 
France and placed them in the Federal Republic of Germany. The true root of the air 
defense issue was France wanted the squadrons not to be armed with nuclear weapons 
unless those weapons were under French control (even though these were NATO 
weapons). The United States would not except this and moved the forces. These events 
set forth a path of France leaving the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966 and 
forged the non-relationships between the Europeans and the Americans. While the 
international community had its doubts about President de Gaulle’s country, France 
thought highly of itself and wanted to prove it to the world.72 
B. LUKEWARM EUROPE 
The European Union has matured from the European Coal and Steel Community, 
European Economic Community, Western European Union and is now the EU who 
incorporates more than 25 European nations.73 With all of the claims presented by 
France, there is always the same overall outcome, which is either a clearly defined no or 
an awkward silence that moves towards an obvious avoidance of the subject. Europe has 
been one of the most important test platforms for national and regional deterrence 
because it is the oldest contested region and the first where nuclear weapons were used to 
protect it. Germany has been consistent throughout its counter claims to France providing 
regional deterrence. Great Britain also resists the French claims and an even more 
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influential player who does not hear the assertions of Paris is the European Union. With 
the nearly 30 members of the European Union resisting the proposal and specific states 
declining bilateral agreements, France’s role will not be a regional deterrent provider for 
Europe.  
Throughout the history of the European Union (and its predecessors) there have 
been attempts to collaborate for common defense and security. Recently, The European 
Union has taken steps to create a European security identity by creating the European 
Security Strategy. In December of 2003, European nations agreed on the priorities for 
European security. The ESS places precedence on NATO and the United States in the 
third paragraph by stating,  
The United States has played a critical role in European integration and 
European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War 
has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. 
However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on 
its own.74 
France, being a part of both institutions, has no deterrence role within the EU for 
nuclear weapons. Throughout the 14 page document there is no mention of nuclear 
deterrence. The piece does identify nuclear weapons being a threat, among other things, 
and highlights the EU’s partnership with NATO to enhance the abilities of both 
organizations. The EU discusses its partnership with NATO as, “The EU-NATO 
permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of 
the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two 
organisations in crisis management.”75 Further codifying the relationship between Europe 
and Washington was the section of the ESS dealing with partnerships. Europe believes, 
“The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and 
the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.”76 These examples, or 
lack thereof, display Europe’s commitment to NATO and the United States to provide 
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mutually beneficial security guarantees. 5 years later an implementation report to show 
the progress of the ESS and again, there was no mention of a French-led nuclear 
deterrence or any significant shift in the reliance on NATO as a valued partner. The 
recommendations actually call for greater cooperation with NATO by saying,  
The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the 
Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. 
We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared 
security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of 
the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work 
on military capabilities.77 
The un-wavering bond between the Europeans and the Americans does not seem 
to be eroding and in the eyes of Europe, closer collaboration is required. This deeper 
relationship does erode France’s request for a greater role within the EU. Paris also has 
no room to unilaterally grow within NATO’s nuclear arm because most of the members 
within the European Union are also members of NATO.  
To get a sense of what other European nations believe of France’s nuclear policies 
and ambitions, Germany, United Kingdom, which is itself a nuclear nation, and Italy will 
be analyzed. There follows a brief history of each nation with regards to nuclear 
weapons, each nation’s interaction with the United States, how each country reacts to 
France’s aspirations to be a regional nuclear security provider, and whether each denies 
France the ability to provide regional deterrence. The preceding nations believe the 
United States should remain Europe’s protector.  
1. Germany 
Germany’s beliefs and the way in which it conducts itself in foreign affairs come 
about due to the climb of the Nazi party during the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Events like World War One, World War Two and the Holocaust have shaped how 
contemporary German affairs are handled. For much of the nuclear debate in Europe, 
Germany was occupied, divided and somewhat limited in its ability to reject outside 
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actors ideas. The mentality of the German population is one of no war or aggressive 
posturing. With the history of Germany being so prevalent, the answer to France’s cry for 
more relevance in a united nuclear Europe is no. Time is the first example of Germany’s 
abstention from a French dominated nuclear deterrence.  
After Germany surrendered on 07 May 1945, they were split up between the four 
major allies (U.S., USSR, UK and France). The state was divided between West 
Germany and East Germany.78  It was not until October 3, 1990, when Germany unified, 
before that each German government had parental oversight by the United States (West 
Germany) and the Soviet Union (East Germany).79  West Germany was very keen on 
maintaining the support from the United States specifically, because of its military 
strength compared to the other allies. The State Department states that U.S. German 
relations are, “a focal point of U.S. involvement in Europe since the end of World War 
II.”80  The tight relationship between the two nations is still strong and shows through 
nuclear affairs. A recurring theme in European affairs is the belief that nuclear weapons 
should never be used for any reason. An Angus Reid poll in 2007 asked several nations 
about the belief of the use of nuclear weapons. Germany was asked if they thought the 
use of nuclear weapons by NATO would be justified to which an astounding 76.9 percent 
would never believe the use is justified. The German government also spoke out against 
the French claims in 2007 when then President Sarkozy sprung a question on the German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel. The German news agency Der Spiegel posted an article 
online where they describe the question posed by Sarkozy. In a meeting between the two 
leaders pertaining to nuclear issues (both nuclear energy and later nuclear weapons), 
Sarkozy shocked German leaders by asking if Germany would, “consider taking a  
 
                                                 
78 English-Online, Results and Aftermath of World War II, n.d. http://www.english-
online.at/history/world-war-2/results-and-aftermath-of-world-war-ii.htm, accessed January 26, 2013. 
79 timeanddate.com. Day of German Unity in Germany. n.d., accessed January 26, 2013 
http://www.timeanddate.com/holidays/germany/german-unity-day. 
80 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Germany, October 02, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm. 
 34
political stake in the French atomic arsenal?”81  Both German leaders (Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister) were stunned and reaffirmed the stance of Germany and French nuclear 
assurances.82 While France has had no progress with Germany, Paris and London had 
nuclear ties in World War Two, but France squandered the opportunity. 
2. Britain 
The British Empire has been one of, if not the, dominate global powers for 
centuries. Only until fairly recently was this mindset altered. The prestigious Empire 
eventually hemorrhaged its colonies and had to regain its footing in the new world after 
World War II. Immediately after the war, the Allies, primarily the Big Three (the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union), set out to divide the spoils of war, 
which became heavily contested among the three nations. Although Britain was, on 
paper, a victor, it came with a price tag of the British Colonies and the British economy 
plummeting. What the British lost during the war was compensated by the trans-Atlantic 
bond with the United States, which translated to cooperation on multiple levels, to 
include nuclear weapons development.83   
Immediately following World War Two, the joint U.S. and UK nuclear 
development process began. The United Kingdom detonated its first nuclear weapon in 
1952 and has maintained operational nuclear weapons from 1956 until the present. While 
the British shared a certain level of aggravation towards the Americans as the French in 
regards to broken promises and general rudeness, but Britain knew that the United States 
was the key to Britain’s success. The UK relied heavily on the U.S. to manufacture 
delivery systems for British nuclear weapons, to include collaboration on the Royal 
Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. With a current nuclear force of just over 200 nuclear 
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missiles, which are deployed via the British Vanguard Class submarines, the United 
Kingdom has the fifth largest nuclear stockpile. To complete the equation of British 
nuclear weapons, the British parliament has a robust nuclear policy in place. While there 
has been much criticism about nuclear weapons launch authority, the Prime Minister 
maintains the bulk of the decision to use such weapons. Even though the Prime Minister 
bears most of the burden, the UK has a similar use policy and contingency plans as the 
United States.  
In broad strokes, nonetheless, the United Kingdom has the capacity for self-
defense through nuclear deterrence. It is incapable and un-willing, conversely, of either 
protecting Europe or defending against an exponentially larger adversary such as the 
former Soviet Union by itself. As such, the United Kingdom will remain on the side of 
the United States; for overlapping reasons, it also will not support France as a provider of 
regional deterrence, although the joint French/British navy collaboration of 2010 does 
demonstrate some level of mutual support.84   
The vital trans-Atlantic relationship is perhaps the biggest factor in the United 
Kingdom’s position on U.S.-led nuclear deterrence. The United Kingdom relied heavily 
on the United States from the beginning of its nuclear ambitions. The United States also 
helped Britain to develop its delivery systems for its warheads, and shared its own fissile 
material with London. Washington also provided assistance with Britain’s nuclear missile 
submarines, and aided in the creation of a suitable framework for London’s nuclear 
policy. The alliance between the two nations has been tested in such recent crises as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Libya, and a genuine partnership dates all the way back to the early 
twentieth century. Moreover, the increased cooperation has affected British foreign 
policy by Britain adopting similar policy objectives as the Americans such as the United 
Kingdom’s nuclear weapons use policy. The policy revolves around a strong defensive 
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posture for London’s nuclear weapons and that their use would be as a measure of last 
resort to protect itself.85  
While the United States provided specific technological and administrative 
support, both states also enjoyed other mutual benefits. While London fielded its own 
nuclear capacity, the United States was able to store and deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in 
the United Kingdom to combat the Soviet threat. The UK also gained the ability to have a 
say in how U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in the UK were going to be used. By enabling 
the UK to have a say in employment of nuclear weapons, the United States helped to 
prop up the UK and make the British become more of a legitimate security provider, 
concomitantly increasing its legitimacy in nuclear deterrence.86 The collaboration 
between Washington and London was in part because of France’s own inanity.  
France and the United Kingdom had a very different history compared to that of 
France and Germany. London and Paris began cooperating in issues related to nuclear 
weapons shortly after the start of World War Two. Through the Cold War, both nations 
attempted to intertwine their nuclear weapons and began a rollercoaster ride of failed 
attempts. By the end of the Cold War, France and Britain were again close to 
cooperation, but the fall of the Soviet Union and a financial crisis ended the venture. The 
contemporary history of the two nuclear nations continued after the Cold War, but 
London continues to uphold existing agreements that it has made to the other allies within 
NATO.  
The first true cooperation attempt after the end of the Second World War to 
collaborate on nuclear weapons was during the 1960s. The British Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, engaged in discussions with French President de Gaulle and proposed 
cooperation on nuclear issues. For Britain, this was an attempt to ease its way into the 
European Economic Community (EEC), but affirmed that nuclear issues would not be 
separated from a NATO context. President Charles de Gaulle would not engage in this 
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due to his belief of an independent nuclear force and controlling the central role for 
nuclear issues between the three allies. The 1970s brought another round of attempts to 
collaborate with France, now that de Gaulle was not in power. British Prime Minister, 
Edward Heath, brought France an identical proposal from the 1960s, but this time it was 
not de Gaulle who thwarted the conversation, it was the French being involved with their 
aspirations to get U.S. assistance with its own nuclear program. France at the time was 
not interested with Britain and talks halted. By 1985 London and Paris had no nuclear 
affiliation with each other. By the late 1980s talks resumed and both governments seemed 
keen on joint development projects, specifically, aviation launched nuclear missiles. The 
fall of the Soviet Union coupled with a financial crisis severed relations and each nation 
took its own path to recovery. The contemporary history of the two nuclear nations 
within Europe has been continually thwarted by current U.S./UK agreements and 
London’s commitment to NATO.87  
While there may still be promising signs that the United Kingdom and France can 
cooperate in nuclear affairs, the current financial crisis (similar to that of the crisis after 
the Cold War) and increased tensions between Britain and France (due to provocative 
statements by Prime Minister Cameron) seem to push one to believe that Great Britain 
will continue to uphold commitments that have already been codified.88 Individual 
nations are pursuing to push France away from a regional deterrence position, but 
international organizations also have gone to great lengths to curb French desires for 
regional deterrence. 
This partnership also worries certain European Union (EU) members about 
Britain being insufficiently “European.” The United Kingdom needs and will need United 
States to maintain its position in European defense. The stability of its own population, 
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nuclear weapons projects, and a healthy fear of protecting all of Europe with some help 
from the French, does not sit well with Britain.89  
3. Italy 
Italy has been under the U.S. nuclear blanket since the end of World War II and 
has no intentions of throwing off these particular covers. After the war, like the rest of 
Europe, Italy was economically hurt by the war and needed the United States of 
America’s help to get back on its feet al.ong with the crippled Italian economy, the 
Italians were concerned over the growing threat of the Soviet Union. As with Britain and 
France, Italy accepted the stationing of American nuclear weapons on its soil for the 
ability to have some say in their use. Italy had little choice as quoted in an article by 
Leopoldo Nuti, in which he said,  
Italian diplomacy had few cards to play. The European scenario after 
World War II was likely to be dominated by two powers, France and 
Britain, which certainly would not soon forget the ‘stab in the back’ of 
1940; Germany was likely to remain in a weakened condition… some 
Italian diplomats considered a flirtation with the USSR to exert pressure 
on the western allies… That left the United States as the only lever 
available to Italian diplomacy to regain some of its previous standing.90     
The issue of nuclear weapons has not been an issue in Italy until just a few years 
ago, correlating to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which became effective in 
March of 1970.91   
Current Italian concerns for nuclear weapons focus on disarmament throughout 
the world. The short answer to the original question of whether or not Italy would want 
Paris providing regional deterrence is “No.” Italy would rather eradicate nuclear weapons 
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as a whole. While Italy still believes in the extinction of nuclear weapons, Italians also 
understand their vital importance to regional stability in Europe. Stefano Silvestri, 
Former Under Secretary of State for Defense and current President of the International 
Affairs Institute, had this to say regarding Italy’s current position: “[T]he American 
nuclear guarantee is still important to European security, and the nuclear element is at its 
core. Italian authorities fear that by removing [the nuclear element]… this guarantee may 
somehow be weakened.”  Silvestri furthers his discussion about the guarantee becoming 
weak by stating it “would risk the credibility of the Alliance’s collective defense 
system.”92 With the Italian government in agreement that the need to continued nuclear 
presence in Europe is vital, but the Italian citizens do not share that opinion.93 Based on a 
poll in 2007, the question was asked of Italian citizens whether the use of nuclear 
weapons by NATO, in which the United States is the largest contributor, would be 
justified. Italy had shown that only 18 percent believed nuclear weapons should be used 
for deterrence purposes only and an astonishing 69.9 percent believed the use of nuclear 
weapons are never justified.  
The clear objection to nuclear weapons gave way to a protest in 2007, when an 
estimated 100,000 people crowded the Italian streets to pressure the Italian government. 
While this display of public disgust has made the Italian government uneasy, it will not 
change the current policy of relying on the United States (through NATO) to provide 
deterrence until the world can universally disarm. For Italy, there would be too much at 
stake to move under a French nuclear umbrella, which would make the situation in 
Europe more volatile and may increase tensions during a critical phase in non-
proliferation.94  
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
For France, the clear role of being a regional deterrent for Europe has been 
constant since the very infancy of French nuclear weapons. Prominent figures in Paris 
from Charles de Gaulle to the current head of state, President Hollande all draw specific 
links between Paris and the rest of Europe in regards to regional security involving 
nuclear weapons. Just as French officials have announced their desire to provide 
deterrence for Europe, the Europeans have denied or abstained from the notion of a 
French deterrence for the continent. Specific members including Germany and Britain 
have been nervous over the claims of France. These claims also create instability in other 
regional powers, such as Russia. The unwillingness to accept France’s proposal clearly 
shows how Europe perceives France’s role in nuclear deterrence. 
France wanted to play a larger role in the decisions to be made with the European 
defense, but with the Anglo-Saxons being considered the main players; France was 
forced into a smaller role. As NATO matured, the notion of the Americans remaining a 
central portion of the European defense plan and the only nation who continued to argue 
against a closer cohabitation was the French. With the multiple attempts to insert 
dialogue about a French-led nuclear deterrence into the European Union discussions, the 
other European nations continue to divert the conversation and even today, the European 
nuclear arm has not been discussed in depth. 
While talks of defense cooperation and collaboration have always been present in 
the EU, the first real attempt to develop a combined security strategy succeeded in 2000 
with the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy and in 2003 with the 
European Security Strategy. European leaders established the ESDP to attempt to use a 
combined European military/defense arm. Europe also published the ESS to establish a 
combined list of potential threats and how to combat them, but never delineated specific 
forces to combat such threats. Neither of these documents discusses nuclear issues even 
though France continues to push a European nuclear agenda.95 
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IV. FURTHER COMPLICATIONS: TIMES ARE TOUGH FOR 
PARIS 
The United States of America has proven for the last 6 decades that it can protect 
Europe from nuclear war. The amount of resources and open space allows the U.S. the 
ability to sustain a large nuclear arsenal. Tough financial times however, have created a 
global situation where stricter rules govern against out of control spending and a 
mentality of austerity. Without debating the exact cause of timeframe of the most recent 
financial crisis, the fact is that many European and others have been seeing a downward 
trend of revenue. When money is entering the nation in smaller quantities, the concept of 
needs and wants becomes harder to manage. Nuclear weapons are particularly difficult to 
classify as a need or a want when it comes to France (and any other nuclear nation under 
the NATO umbrella), the choices are to maintain an expensive, independent nuclear 
program or dismantle the Force de Frappe and use the existing nuclear umbrella provided 
mainly by the Americans. France has made it quite clear that its intention is to continue 
spending large sums of money on developing and modernizing its nuclear force.  
A. MONEY MATTERS 
In a report by Bruno Tertrais, a Senior Research Fellow for the Foundation for 
Strategic Research, he looks at the nuclear situation for France in 2030. Tertrais points 
out many important factors that lead France to continue its nuclear funding; factors which 
all stem from the unchanged nuclear environment. Some potential scenarios include 
conflicts with Russia, North Korea and state sponsored terrorism. While Tertrais points 
out three possible scenarios for 2030 (ranging from doubling the number of nuclear 
nations to ending the use of all nuclear weapons), the two that will drive France to 
maintain nuclear spending for the foreseeable future will always outweigh the third. 
Because of the realistic approach when dealing with nuclear weapons, nations will 
always plan for the worst and hope for the best. With a somewhat clear motive behind 
France’s spending on nuclear weapons going down and the continued urge to pursue a 
larger deterrent role, Paris cannot supply Europe with a credible deterrence as the 
Americans can.  
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With the apparent willingness to use nuclear weapons if Paris felt threatened, the 
issue then becomes whether France can afford the current nuclear force and if President 
Holland can expand the Force de Frappe to provide deterrence for the continent. In a 
report from Global Zero, France spends $61 billion on defense and $10.7 billion of the 
defense budget is allocated for nuclear weapons. In 2011, nuclear budget increased by 
$2.7 billion even though the economic crisis has engulfed Europe for several years. For 
the claims of French officials to be reinforced by a reliable infrastructure, Paris would 
have to increase its defense budget to a level that is sufficient to maintain the same level 
of security in Europe as the Americans provide through NATO. The United States 
currently allocates $708 billion to NATO’s defense budget, which is just over 4.7 percent 
of the total defense budget. France provides just $52 billion, which represents just 2 
percent of the total defense budget. The 2010 NATO defense budget review also shows 
that France contributed less in 2011 than in 2010, which differs from the United States, 
which increased its contributions by nearly $70 billion. While most will argue that the 
United States does not use the entire budget for nuclear weapons, it does show the large 
gap between the U.S. and French contributions and the need for France to invest more 
into defense to attempt to provide a credible deterrent.96  
B. NUCLEAR DECISIONS 
The ultimate aim of French strategy is to keep France at the heart of European 
security and defense. But while France may want to provide nuclear guarantees to the 
region, France does not have the material or finances to play this role in the region and 
furthermore, Europe does not want such a guarantee from France alone. For France, there 
are three critical items that must be addressed in order to improve the national deterrence 
and create a stable regional deterrence: 1) restarting production of fissile material; 2) 
improving or purchasing new delivery systems; and restructuring nuclear use/deterrence 
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policy. In all three cases, the evidence suggests that France could not fill the role that the 
United States currently plays in European nuclear security and defense. 
1. Fissile Material 
Beginning in 1992, France started dismantling its fissile material production 
capabilities in accordance with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which set 
out to become a stepping stone to universal disarmament. France had two fissile material 
production facilities for nuclear weapons, one in Pierrelatte and the other in Marcoule. 
The Pierrelatte facility was responsible for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), an 
element primarily used for nuclear armaments, for France from 1979 until 1996. In the 
facility’s seventeen years of operation, it was able to produce roughly 70,000 pounds of 
HEU, which equates to just over eleven pounds per day. According to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it takes approximately twenty-five kilograms (55.12 
pounds) to create a nuclear weapon with a similar yield of the weapons used on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II.97   
With facilities already inside of France, it would seem plausible that Paris would 
be able to re-generate fissile material production and create a significant nuclear weapon 
every five days and five to six warheads every month. With just one facility, France 
would be able to stockpile the same number of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in 
Europe in just over three years. The challenges contained in a potential re-generation of 
French fissile material production are two-fold. With the current economic crisis and 
enormous operating/production cost of fissile material would surely bring France to its 
knees.  
Using Pierrelatte as a template and a goal of matching the American arsenal in 
three years, France would need roughly one more facility comparable to Pierrelatte to 
enrich the Uranium needed to produce enough fissile material in three years, with the 
added redundancy built into the production infrastructure. The idea of creating one more 
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facility would simply not be entertained at any level of French government and certainly 
not within France’s citizens and taxpayers.  
2. Delivery Systems 
France has maintained multiple delivery systems for its nuclear arsenal. As of 
2008, France maintains some sixty aircraft and four submarines. Operating cost for these 
assets are becoming ever greater and with the solution of the current economic crisis 
getting ever farther away, France finds it difficult to maintain the existing French nuclear 
fleet, never the less fund additional units for regional defense. The U.S. operates more 
than ten ballistic missile submarines, hundreds of land-based missiles, and numerous air 
force bombers. The United States also still maintains forward deployed units to respond 
to any threat within minutes.  
The only way for France to rival the Americans would be to dedicate more of the 
French gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending. As of 2010, France provides 
just over 39,000 Euros (roughly $52,000 using 2010 average exchange rate) to NATO’s 
defense budget, compared to the United States average of $785,000. While every penny 
does not go into the nuclear portion of the American nuclear arsenal, nuclear weapons are 
not the only arm in nuclear deterrence. U.S. military forces contribute a legitimate piece 
to deterrence, which is something France cannot support. France would run into a similar 
problem as in the previous section in the fact that France would have to build more 
military infrastructure to build enough forces to rival Washington and potentially lure 
European nations to turn toward France for security and deterrence. France would thus 
have to increase its share by 1500 percent of its current share. While Europe may have 
the infrastructure to increase and modernize French nuclear delivery vehicles, France 
itself does not, and would therefore be reliant on other nations to aid in France’s ability to 
provide enough delivery systems for regional defense, where the United States has the 
infrastructure to support the mission of extended deterrence.98  
                                                 
98 North American Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, 
Economic (NATO, 2011). 
 45
3. Policy 
The last area in which the French government would need to re-structure would 
be its nuclear policy. As it stands, the French nuclear policy is aggressive compared to 
other allied nuclear nations. While this stance does provide a certain level of credibility, it 
also generates a certain level of instability and un-easiness within Europe. Most European 
nations prefer the United States nuclear policy because it is not too provocative. It relies 
on the American numerical and technological strength to back up the policy of a last 
resort use. While the previous statement would suggest that the United States may never 
actually use nuclear weapons (which is made clear earlier in the piece with regards to 
France becoming a nuclear nation), the United States also, on paper, makes it clear that 
they will not hesitate to use such weapons if deemed necessary.  
France on the other hand maintains, in simple terms, a first use policy. If France 
deems that its vital interests are at risk, it will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. While 
this policy has not been challenged by anyone, it also does not definitively tell us whether 
France will actually use nuclear weapons in this context. On words alone, however, the 
French may seem more prone to use nuclear weapons, which may start a potential chain 
reaction that could lead to the destruction of the Earth. For France to gain the trust of its 
European allies, it would have to alter its nuclear use strategy to a more defensive stance 
as opposed to an aggressive/offensive strategy.  
Understandably, there would be trade-offs to the change in strategy, but a new, 
more relaxed strategy would be more enticing to regional partners. France cannot change 
its nuclear policy because it does not have a large enough force to deter larger potential 
rivals, such as Russia or China. France would not have enough of an arsenal to deliver 
enough damage to stop any outside aggression and would likely be destroyed where 
larger nations may be able to survive the entire French arsenal.99   
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France could never provide a credible deterrent to the European community. 
There is just not enough evidence and to many unknowns for European nations to favor 
France over the United States with regards to nuclear security. Instead, France should 
maintain its position in the nuclear community and supplement regional security to 
Europe through NATO and other international organizations. 
Perhaps the largest reason as to why France would not take the nuclear deterrence 
mission away from Washington would be European politics and culture. The dynamic 
differences between the European governments and European citizens become quite 
apparent in past and present literature. The European Security Strategy ratified in 2003 
outlines the two biggest concepts for Europe, multilateralism and soft power. 
Multilateralism is a concept where the EU makes decisions as a whole and does not work 
through unilateral means. Soft power tactics rely on using all diplomatic means (treaties, 
sanctions, etc.) before considering military actions. These two principles hold the key to 
European society with regards to security. European nations are generally against military 
actions and do not appreciate unilateral action. The reason for the citizens of Europe’s 
dislike for war and military actions lies in Europe’s history. With the vast technological 
differences between the United States nuclear force and the force de frappe, there may 
not be the critical factor in the other European nation’s willingness to use France as their 
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V. CONCLUSIONS: RETHINKING THE FRENCH ROLE 
For decades, France has laid claims to provide regional nuclear deterrence. Paris 
unfortunately must change numerous pieces of its nuclear infrastructure to better promote 
its capability to protect other nations. France has built an extensive national nuclear 
deterrent force which is one of the most technologically advanced throughout the nuclear 
world. Its nuclear policy shows strong signs of credibility including some built in 
redundancies (nuclear dyad and a theoretical redundant chain of command). For more 
than 50 years France has geared its nuclear program for the purposes of national defense, 
even though prominent members in the French government preach for an expanded role. 
Surrounding nations believe France should give up its aspirations and strengthen existing 
institutions to better protect the continent. Intergovernmental organizations (NATO 
specifically) also want France to integrate into the larger nuclear infrastructure, which 
would strengthen the overall institution. With nuclear weapons being such a delicate 
topic, the implications of sending multiple signals about the strength and unification can 
be great, with the potential for war present.  
The way ahead for France becomes somewhat simple to justify because of the 
evidence that suggests Paris should bring itself into NATOs nuclear structure, which will 
raise France’s prestige and ultimately give Paris a larger say on the continent in regards 
to nuclear security. The real question may have different answers for different entities, 
but the decision can only be made by Paris.  
A. THE NATO FACTOR 
With France re-joining NATO’s integrated military structure, NATO allies have 
called for France to enrich NATO’s capabilities and to supplement its strength in all areas 
of the alliance, to include nuclear deterrence. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concepts display 
the position of the international organization. The Strategic Concept notes,  
“The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the 
strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United 
States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom 
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and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the 
overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”101 
The importance of the three nuclear nations within NATO was not limited to 
2010, but even in 1991. Even though France was not re-integrated into the military 
structure, its nuclear force was labeled as playing an essential role within the Alliance. 
The exact same language used in 2010 was used in 1991. NATO has also noted at the 
Lisbon Summit in May 2012 that France, UK and the United States each has a right to 
use nuclear weapons independently (i.e., self-defense), but must do so with strict 
limitations. While France believes in a regional deterrent role within Europe through its 
own national nuclear force, they are already providing a vital role in deterrence in the 
eyes of NATO. With NATO and Paris having different opinions about France’s role in 
nuclear deterrence, there is a perceived sense of weakness to the Alliance that may erode 
the credibility of the nuclear deterrence for Europe. 
The discord present between NATO and France may have negative outcomes in 
the eyes of the international community. Much like a board meeting in a large company, 
if each member has his or her own projected path of the company, the company would 
not be taken seriously in the business arena. Even without France’s contribution to 
nuclear deterrence, NATO does provide a high level of credibility; however, France can 
lower the level of credibility by not speaking with a single voice in harmony with NATO, 
EU and individual European nations.  
Many aggressor nations in the world today use realistic tactics in regards to 
political issues. The issues brought up by these nations become more complicated when 
nuclear weapons are involved. States like North Korea strive to achieve nuclear weapons 
to gain leverage over neighboring states and regional hegemons. In regards to nuclear 
weapons, John Mearsheimer notes,  
Non-nuclear rivals are sure to go to great lengths to acquire nuclear 
arsenals of their own, and once they do, it would be difficult, although not 
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impossible, for a great power to reestablish superiority by insulating itself 
from nuclear attack.102 
While the belief of this international relations framework is that nuclear weapons 
are the sole answer to gain a great power status, it does note that gaining that status is 
much harder when other nations have nuclear weapons and may have more of an impact 
in an area that only has one nuclear nation. The argument can thus be made that the more 
states that possess nuclear weapons, the less stable the world is. By nuclear nations 
banding together, they can reduce the amount of nuclear entities in the world and gain 
leverage throughout the globe. By France promoting a separate goal than its allies (EU 
and NATO), it creates an avenue where other nations can rise to the nuclear age. What 
France should consider is an embrace of France’s role within NATO. By acceptance of 
the role NATO provides for France, it will regain an important role in global affairs.  
B. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GRANDEUR 
There are many areas where France can regain its preeminence and be seen as a 
world leader. France’s leading role in Mali—though decidedly not a nuclearized 
conflict—shows both the old aspiration to have a prominent role in world affairs and the 
increasingly familiar alliance orientation of French engagements.  
One area that Paris can use to improve its position in European nuclear affairs is 
to embrace the role that NATO has provided itself. By unifying NATO’s voice, France 
can strengthen NATO’s nuclear deterrence and make other aggressors think further about 
testing NATO’s resolve. While nuclear deterrence through offensive means is important, 
defensive capabilities have also been recently highlighted as an important focal point for 
NATO. The current EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach) is a U.S. led initiative 
to protect Europe from Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) from Iran and 
North Korea.103 While a soft plan is in place, to be completed in 2020, there is still 
potential for France to cooperate and play a large role in European nuclear defense. One 
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other way in which France can improve its standing in Europe and NATO is to re-
integrate back into NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG addresses nuclear 
matters and policy within the Alliance. France is the only member of NATO who does 
not participate and leave France in a bad position where it cannot influence any nuclear 
decision for NATO.104 Any of the previous avenues will bring France closer to the 
nuclear table within NATO and improve its credibility within Europe.  
What France cannot do is continue down a path where neither NATO nor the EU 
will support an independent nuclear armed France. If European history has taught the 
world one thing in regards to the French extended deterrence, it’s that Paris is being 
offered an opportunity to influence NATO’s nuclear decisions in Europe and the rest of 
Europe does not want France to take over extended deterrence from the Americans. 
France for the last few centuries has been trying to regain its position within Europe and 
the world, but an autonomous nuclear force is not the avenue to travel. The avenue to 
pursue is one where the United States and France works closer together and cooperates 
through the existing NATO’s nuclear framework. Close cooperation may ease fiscal 
concerns and improve political standing with both NATO and the EU (and the nations 
involved in each institution). France is already an important player in regional nuclear 
deterrence for Europe, it just needs to embrace NATO and the prestige will follow. 
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